Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide "special deals" for favored private firms. We argue that China's extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal benefits, either political or monetary, from providing special deals. Competition between local governments limits the predatory effects of special
Introduction
A standard explanation for the extraordinary economic growth in China over the last four decades is that this growth was driven by the gradual improvement of formal economic institutions. Advocates of this explanation point to reforms such as the restoration of incentives to farmers and opening to foreign investment in the 1980s, the centralization of the banking system that started in the mid-1990s, the restructuring of state-owned firms and clean-up of the bad debts in the late 1990s and early 2000s, accession to the WTO in 2001 and the gradual removal of internal migration barriers.
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While these policy reforms are undeniably important, this narrative sits uneasily with other pieces of evidence. Huang (2008) documents that many of the pro-market reforms of the 1980s were later reversed. It is still the case that there is no clear formal legal protection for private property in China, nor is there an independent judiciary that enforces contracts and adjudicates commercial disputes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) , drawing on the account in McGregor But how can economy with such poor institutions grow at the rate and for as long as China has? The answer, we suggest, lies in the set of informal institutions that emerged in China in the early 1990s. The key feature of these competence in supporting private business are recognized and promoted. The benefits can also be entirely monetary, ranging from tuition payments for their child to (hidden) equity stakes in favored private firms held by family members. Because of the high powered incentives to support private firms, a large and increasing number of Chinese firms benefit from the special deals. So the Chinese system is best described not simply as regime of special deals but one where there is almost "free entry" into special deals.
Third, a large number of local governments actively support private firms.
Moreover, they compete ferociously with other local governments to attract and support their businesses. As described by McGregor (2010) (pg. 175-176) , "What is obvious for anyone who travels around the country is how much of the economy is driven by another factor altogether, a kind of Darwinian internal competition, that pits localities against each other....each Chinese province, city, county, and village furiously compete to gulp down any economic advantage they can lure their way." Competition between local governments is crucial in limiting the predatory power of protected firms. A local government can block competitors of favored firms in its locality but has no ability to do so in other cities. Competition also gives firms options when faced with incompetent or predatory local governments.
In summary, China has "extractive economic institutions" -to borrow Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)'s pithy term -where political elites extract rents from the rest of society. But "extractive economic institutions" in China come with unique "Chinese characteristics" that has made all the difference. First, local political elites extract rents by enabling favored firms to generate more profits in the first place. They can do this because of the enormous administrative capacity of local governments, and the resulting growth of local businesses enables local elites to extract even more rents. Second, local elites get personal benefits from these rents, and thus the local administrative apparatus is laserfocused on supporting favored firms. Third, thousands of local governments compete ferociously to attract and support firms, thus limiting the ability of an individual local government to harm other businesses.
Understanding the Chinese system as a regime of special deals also clarifies the risks that China faces. First, special deals rely on the discretion of local officials and their incentives to provide special deals. And here a central fact is the anti-corruption campaign that has been in place since 2014. While there is limited information on the crackdown, if local officials are motivated by private economic benefits, the crackdown on corruption will dampen their incentive to use their authority to grease the wheel for private firms. If special deals as practiced in China has been growth enhancing -as we suggest it has -the crackdown on corruption will result in lower growth. Second, special deals are at the root of the tension between China and its trading partners.
Companies based in countries that do not have access to special deals find themselves disadvantaged when they compete with Chinese companies that do. Foreign companies in the Chinese market either have to make their own special deal or, as is the case with a Chinese firm that does not have a special deal, find that their intellectual property and contracts are not well respected.
An important and still unresolved question is how the world trading system can accommodate countries based on rules as well as those based on access to special deals.
Our narrative of special deals with Chinese characteristics is closely related to Huang (2008) 's account of "Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics" and Xu (2011)'s description of China as "Regionally Decentralized Authoritarianism." Huang (2008) documents the emergence of special deals in China in the early 1990s and argues that such deals are harmful to economic growth. Xu (2011) argues that powerful local governments are behind the growth of private firms, but is silent on the key fact that local support for private firms almost always takes the form of special deals. Our hypothesis is that it is precisely the combination of special deals and powerful local governments that has underpinned China's economic success over the last 30 or so years and, at the same time, has created risks for the future.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first describe how special deals in China work. We then lay out a model of special deals to examine how the "Chinese characteristics" -high administrative capacity, ability to obtain private benefits, and local competition -determine the magnitude of special deals and their effect on economic growth. The next section uses data from multiple sources -the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, the Economic Censuses, firm registries from the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, micro-data on land sales, and a survey of politically connected firms -to provide suggestive evidence on the nature of special deals, that firms grow when they have access to special deals, and that local governments support their favored local firms.
The last section discusses the risks inherent in an economic institution based on access to special deals.
How do Special Deals Work in China?
We begin by describing how a specific local government supports private business. We visited a city in Southern China in 2013 where we had extensive discussions with local officials and private businesses. on is "actively look for quality prospects" and arrange special deals for these businesses. We witnessed a monthly meeting organized by the Party-Secretary and Mayor with the seven Vice-Mayors to coordinate their activities supporting private business. We estimate that about 200 private businesses in this city, most of them the city's largest employers, have "special deals" negotiated by the Vice-Mayors, Mayor or even the local Communist Party Secretary.
What we witnessed in this city is evident to anyone who has done business in China, that a central priority of Chinese local governments is to attract and support private businesses. We illustrate the consequences by looking at how local governments affected the implementation of China's formal industrial policy in the last two decades. In the late 1990s, the central government designated 9 "strategic and pillar" industries that were restricted to a handful of state-owned firms. 4 In 2015, the central government made explicit an additional list -the so called "negative list" -of 12 industries where foreign firms were prohibited. 5 Of the 12 "negative list" industries, 7 were also on the list of "strategic and pillar"
industries so a total of 14 industries were off limits for private and/or foreign firms.
The goal of these policies was to create powerful state owned firms in these sectors by restricting entry. 6 Brandt et al. (2018) shows that entry barriers are negative related to the size of the state sector across Chinese cities. 7 We calculate these two numbers from the micro-data of the Annual Survey of Industrial Production described later in the paper. Shanghai-GM, a joint venture between GM and the Shanghai Automobile Industrial Company (SAIC). SAIC is a publicly traded firm with a majority stake held by the Shanghai local government. SAIC also operates a joint-venture with Volkswagen (Shanghai-Volkswagen) as well as a stand-alone car company. GM's strategy in China was to use the political power of its partner SAIC to obtain exclusive rights to sell "large" sedans (with engines larger than 2500cc), and the local government of Shanghai worked hard to protect GM's monopoly power.
As Dunne (2011) (pg. 15) put it, "car-building Chinese cities act almost like sovereign countries, building a fortress around their home markets, while working very hard to export their cars to other Chinese cities," and Shanghai was no exception to this behavior.
However, GM's strategy of exploiting its monopoly power ran into resistance. 9 GM-Shanghai is formally registered as a foreign firm in China and was the largest car manufacturer in China. It has been successful financially primarily because it has used the political power of the Shanghai local government to protect its local market. Chery's local market -the city of Wuhu -is simply too small for a similar strategy to be viable, and thus Chery's success was largely built on its sales outside of China.
Shanghai-GM, despite being the largest car producer in China, only served the domestic Chinese market.
Finally, we return to the case of the entrepreneur discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) Dai illustrates the importance of competition in giving options to entrepreneurs whose deals fall through in other cities. Fourth, the allusion to corrupt local officials by East Hope's CEO hints that private benefits may be important in providing local officials with an incentive to support local firms.
A Model of Special Deals
This section sketches a model of "special deals" in an environment with "bad" formal institutions. The key idea is that a subset of firms benefit from special deals that other firms do not have access to. We will examine the determinants of the benefits that favored firms obtain, how many firms get access to deals, 10 Jiangsu Delong is located in Yangcheng City. See http://www.dlnis.com/AboutUs/Profile.asp, accessed on January 29, 2019.
11 Jiangsu Delong also operates several nickel-iron alloy plants in Indonesia.
and the effect of special deals on the real wage.
Preferences are given by
where z ∈ [0, 1] indexes the product. There are two potential technologies for each product given by (1 − δ)e A(1−z) ("A" technology) and (1 − δ)e Bz ("B" technology) where 0 < δ < 1 represents the TFP loss from "bad" institutions. We view δ as a reduced form representation of the productivity loss due to the thicket of official rules and regulations behind China's poor ranking in the World Bank's Doing Business Indicators. Output is the product of the chosen technology and labor.
12 Given preferences and the production function, the profit maximizing price is the standard markup over marginal cost.
Consider first a benchmark where the chosen technology is the product of 1 − δ and max{e
Definez as the cutoff where the A technology is chosen for z <z and B is chosen for z >z. This cutoff is given by:
After imposing profit maximization and labor market clearing, the real wage ω is then:
where the cutoff productz is defined above.
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Now consider a special deal regime where some firms get benefits and other firms do not. The political leader provides two types of benefits to a subset of the A firms. First, local political leaders in China help favored firms circumvent burdensome rules. These can take the form of firm specific exemptions to official rules and the implicit sanctioning of violations of regulations (such as the East Hope Group's foray into the aluminum industry). We model this benefit as an increase in firm TFP from (1 − δ)e A(1−z) to (1 − δ + γ)e A(1−z) where 0 < γ < δ.
We interpret γ as capturing the ability of the local government to alleviate the effect of poor overall institutions for specific firms. For example, γ would be low in places where the local bureaucracy is incompetent or where the local political leader has other priorities.
A second benefit is that potential competitors of the favored firms are blocked from the market. Chery found it very difficult to sell in Shanghai because the three dominant local automobile manufacturers are supported by the City of exceeds the TFP of the corresponding B firms. So blocking has no effect and as long as γ > 0 the special deal regime raises the real wage. However, if z c >z, then consumers get access to worse technologies for products z ∈ [z, z c ]. In this case, the effect of special deals on the real wage is ambiguous, as it depends on the benefit of γ > 0 for firms z ∈ [0, z c ] relative to the loss from blocking better B
A third institutional feature of special deals in China is that they are provided by local governments that compete ferociously with each other. Suppose that firms with the A technologies are in city A and firms with B technologies in 14 The three dominant local car companies in Shanghai are SAIC, Shanghai-GM, and Shanghai-Volkswagen. city B. Further, assume that workers freely move between the two cities, which implies that in equilibrium the real wage is the same in the two cites. There are two effects of local competition. First, we now have two cities supporting local firms instead of only one. So some B firms also get supported by their local government. Second, a local government can only protect their firms in their locality but has no power in the other locality. Going back to the example of the automobile industry, GM was the favored firm in Shanghai but it did not have any preferences in Wuhu (or in any Chinese city outside of Shanghai).
To isolate this third effect, suppose the political leader in A supports local firms, but the one in B does nothing to support her local firms (we can easily relax this assumption). We assume z c >z and that workers can freely move between the two cities. The key difference is that the political boss in A can only block competitors in her jurisdiction, but has no power in B. These two assumptions limit the loss due to blocking. Intuitively, when city A blocks better technologies produced in city B, this raises the cost of living in city A and thus lowers the real wage in city A relative to B (for a given relative nominal wage).
Workers then reallocate from A to B and the share of products made by A falls until the real wage is equalized in the two cities.
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Why would a political leader choose to provide special deals to some firms instead of reducing δ which benefits all firms. One answer is that the political leader can extract rents from providing special deals whereas she has limited ability to do so if all firms are treated equally. To capture this idea, we assume firms with special preferences pay a share β σ−1 of their profits to the political leader (and non-favored firms do not pay). This assumption implies that, all else equal, the political leader prefers to help more profitable (and presumably larger) firms.
If the political leader can get a share of the firm's profits if she provides the firm with a special deal, why doesn't the local leader make the deal available to all firms? One answer is the nature of a special deal regime is that the deals have 15 The online Appendix lays out the details of the model with two cities.
to be individually negotiated. Each firm that has a special deal comes with a cost to the political leader, either in the form of political capital or in the time her bureaucracy spends. This is one way to view the fact that the Vice-Mayors in the city we described work long hours negotiating deals and solving problems for the favored firms.
We capture this last idea by assuming each special deal entails a fixed cost given by . After equating the political leader's return from helping the marginal firm to the fixed cost, we get the following expression for
So the political leader provides deals to the most productive firms z ∈ [0, z c ].
The number of firms with special deals z c is larger when the political leader gets more private benefits (β is larger), the local government has more capacity (γ is larger) and can thus provide more assistance, and when the fixed cost F is low.
The key variables that determine the number of firms with access to special deals and their effect on the real wage are β ("private benefits"), γ ("state capacity"), and local competition. Figure 2 illustrates the effect on the real wage for different values of these parameters. It is useful to distinguish the following cases:
• No Private Benefits: This is simply the baseline economy. Here the degree of local competition and state capacity does not matter. Even when the local government has high capacity, this is not used because the political leader has no incentive to help.
• Low Capacity and Large Private Benefits: The top panel in Figure 2 illustrates the effect of special deals on the real wage when γ = 0 for different values of β. Here the only effect of more private benefits (higher β) is to Note: Figures present the real wage when firms with "A" technology have access to special deals relative to the benchmark where β = 0 and γ = 0. "One-city" assumes "A" firms with special deals blocks competitors in cities A and B; "Two cities" assumes "A" firms with special deals only blocks competitors in city A. β σ−1 is the political leader's share of firm profits. γ is the increase in TFP in the "favored" firms. The bottom panel assumes γ = 0.1. increase the number of firms that are protected from competitors. This effect is attenuated with local competition (this is the case labeled "two cities") because workers move from city A to B in response to higher costs in A. Still, the effect of special deals on the real wage is either nothing (for low levels of β) or negative (for high levels of β).
• High Capacity and Large Private Benefits: The bottom panel of Figure 2 presents the case when local governments also alleviate bad institutions for favored firms.
16 Favored firms get two benefits: a boost in TFP and protection from competitors. Here, starting from low levels of β, more private benefits increases the real wage. Intuitively for low levels of private benefits, an increase in β increases the number of favored firms. These firms benefit from higher TFP, and these are already the firms with the best technology so there is no negative effect from blocking better competitors. Beyond the "optimal" level of private benefits (in the figure around β = 0.08), further increases in β lowers the real wage. The negative effect of blocking more competitors outweighs the TFP boost of the marginal favored firms. And here, as in the "low capacity" case, the negative effect is attenuated with competition between cities.
The model is highly stylized and can be extended in many directions. Here we mention three. First, we assume perfect allocation of labor within a city. We can extend the model to allow for other resources such as land and capital, and a benefit the local leader can provide is access to local resources. The aggregate effect depends on whether preferential access to resources improve or worsen the allocation of resources. In the next section we will examine the extent to which favored firms also obtained preferential access to land and capital.
Second, another benefit of local competition is that it gives options to firms that find themselves in cities where the local leader is incompetent or more generally where an entrepreneur does not get the support she needs. The story 16 Figure 2 assumes γ = 0.1.
of Dai Guofeng, who after trying several times was able to find support for his heavy metals company in a different city, illustrates this. It would be easy to extend the model to allow firms to move between cities and locate in the city that gives them the best deal.
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Third, the only cost of private benefits of political leaders in the model is the potential loss of better products. 18 The model can be extended to consider other losses. For example, the model is static, but if firms also make a dynamic investment decision, their incentive to invest is lower because a share of their profits goes to the political leader. On the other hand, if the political leader indirectly owns some of the equity (and we will provide some evidence later in the paper that this might be the case), then she has the incentive to maximize the present discounted value of the flow of profits of the firm.
Growth with Chinese Characteristics
The period between the early 1990s and 2008 before the onset of the global financial crisis was the highest growth episode in recent Chinese history, with GDP growth averaging 11% per year. We suggest that this growth was driven by the emergence of a special deal regime best characterized as a "high capacity and private benefits" regime. We present four types of evidence consistent with this interpretation. First, we present aggregate evidence of the growing importance of large firms, particularly of large conglomerates. Second, we show employment growth rates are higher in cities where returns to special deals are higher. Third, we present direct evidence of political ties and preferences of successful firms. Fourth, we provide evidence that localities block better firms from selling into their markets. 17 We also assume that a firm that is offered a special deal accepts the deal. We can also relax this assumption.
18 It also redistributes profits from the firm's owner to the politician, but this has no effect on the real wage. 
Growth of Large Firms and Conglomerates
The model described earlier assumes the incentive to provide special deals is that the local leader gets a share of the firm's profits. This assumption implies that all else equal, political leaders prefer to provide deals to larger firms. Furthermore, if part of the special deal is that these firms are exempt from inefficient formal rules, then large firms will gain relative to the other firms as a consequence of the availability of special deals.
We begin by showing the change in the importance of large firms in China. We use the firm registration records from China's State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) to document systematically the emergence of conglomerates such as the East Hope and Anbang Groups. This data is a universe of all registered firms in China, and the data is unique in that it provides information on the owners. The owners can be another firm, a holding shell, or a private individual. Importantly, as long as the shell company is registered in China, the SAIC data identifies the owners of the holding shells, and these owners can be individuals or (as is frequently the case) other holding shells. to more than 15 thousand from 1995 to 2015. Among the 1000 largest conglomerates, the average number of firms rose from 60 to more than 3 thousand over the same time period. Table 3 shows that not only has the size of the largest conglomerates increased, but the ownership structure of the conglomerates has also changed.
The table shows that share of the subsidiaries (all firms outside of the original core company of the conglomerate) of the conglomerate that are joint ventures with other firms. Among the top 1000 conglomerates in 1995, about 30% of the conglomerates subsidiaries were joint ventures. By 2015, the the share of joint- 21 We have no information on shell companies in the SAIC data that are registered outside of China. ventures was more than 80%. Anbang Insurance is the dark circle in the middle and the circles with other 22 The state owned firms are Shangai Automobile (15%) and Sinopec (7%). Shanghai Automobile is owned by the city of Shanghai and GM's joint venture partner discussed earlier.
Sinopec is one of the three centrally owned oil companies created by the breakup of the Ministry of Petroleum. 
Heterogeneity Across Cities in Impact of Special Deals
In the previous section, we showed that large private firms, particularly mixedownership conglomerates, increasingly dominate the Chinese economy. In the model we laid out in the previous section, favored firms benefit from a proportional increase in their TFP, so the return to a special deal is increasing in firm TFP. We now examine the cross-sectional implication of the same force.
Specifically, if high TFP firms benefit more from special deals, the effect of a city providing special deals on aggregate TFP in the city will be larger in cities where the right tail of the firm TFP distribution is thicker. The employment growth rate of a city is from 1998 to 2007, and is a proxy for aggregate TFP growth of the city. 23 The employment share of large private firms is from 1998, and is a proxy for the share of privately owned firms with high TFP. As can be seen, the relationship is clear: cities with more high TFP firms initially also grow faster over time. After controlling for the city's initial level of employment, province fixed effects, and distance to the nearest port, the OLS regression of the city's employment growth rate from 1998 to 2007 on the city's employment share of large private firms yields a precisely estimated coefficient of .196 (s.e.=.029).
Political Ties and Preferential Treatment
We now turn turn to more direct evidence of links of ties between political leaders and firms. We begin by using the micro-data of a survey of private firms that 23 The logic is that with labor mobility aggregate growth in a city shows up on the extensive margin. See Brandt et al. (2018) for cross-city evidence on the size of the state sector, entry and TFP from the economic census data. What has changed over time is the advantage of firms owned by PC/PCC members. The survey distinguishes between members of the PC/PCC at the level of the provinces or above, prefectures, or counties or below. Table 4 shows the sales of firms owned by PC/PCC members (at each level of government) relative to sales of firms whose owners are not in the PC/PCC. Two facts stand out.
First, not surprisingly, firms owned by PC/PCC members are larger. Second, the sales gap has increased over time. For owners in county-level PC/PCC, the sales gap increased by 1 log point between 1997 and 2012. And for owners in top-tier Provincial-level PC/PCC, the sales gap increased by almost 3 log points over this period. Note: Entries are coefficients (and standard errors) of a regression of log bank loans on indicator variables for whether the firm's owner is a member of a Provincial or above PC/PCC (row 1), Prefectural Level PC/PCC (row 2), or County Level or below PC/PCC (row 3). Omitted firms are those whose owners are not PC/PCC members. All regressions also include log sales and indicator variables for two digit industries. Local governments also provide land at below market costs to favored firms.
Using the power of eminent domain, local governments obtain land from farmers, urban residents and other channels, and resell the land to developers and firms. This is the main mechanism via which land use has been transformed in China in recent decades. We obtained transaction level records of these sales from 2000 to 2014 from China's Ministry of Land Resources. For each transaction, we have information on the size of the parcel (in hectares), geographic location, sales price, and indicator variables for whether the land is to be used for housing, commercial real estate, or industrial real estate.
The top panel in Figure 6 plots the allocation of this land between commercial, industrial, and residential use. Specifically, it shows the share of land (in hectares) sold to three types of end users. Roughly 50-60% of new land was dedicated for industrial use. The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the log price per hectare of land sold for industrial use and commercial use relative to land destined for housing. Industrial land is sold at a substantial discount to residential land. In 2014, for example, the price of industrial land was more than 2 log points lower than that of residential land. In contrast, the price of commercial land is roughly the same as that of residential land.
The obvious problem with interpreting Figure 6 as evidence that local governments subsidize favored firms with cheap land is that industrial land may be very different from residential land. Residential land may be mostly located in higher priced urban locations, while industrial land is concentrated in cheaper more remote locations. Table 6 shows the price gap after we introduce a succession of controls for location. Column 1 replicates the mean gap in prices shown in Figure 6 . On average industrial land is -1.7 log points cheaper compared to residential land. Column 2 shows that the price gap drops to 1.5 log points after we introduce indicator variables for counties. So counties with cheaper land allocate more land to industrial use, but within the same county, industrial land is still cheaper than residential land. Column 3 keeps the indicator variables for county and adds controls for the distance of the land from the county center.
There is little effect on the price gap. Finally, column 4 looks within narrowly defined neighborhoods and compares the price of land destined for different uses within the same neighborhood. 29 There is little change in the implied subsidy that recipients of industrial land get.
The ultimate question is whether the subsidies in land prices to industrial firms improve efficiency relative to the allocation before local governments started to sell the land. Most of this land comes from farmers, so the question is whether the land is now used more productively by industrial firms compared to its use as farmland. We do not have the data to answer this question, but here we point to evidence that the average labor productivity in industrial sector is larger than in the agricultural sector. 
Local Protection and Exports
We argue that special deals in China are provided by local governments, and part of the deal is that competitors of the favored firms are blocked from the Shanghai-GM's export was negligible. In contrast, while Chery only accounted for 5% of domestic car sales, 20% of cars exported from China were produced by Chery. The idea then is that local protection breaks the relationship between productivity and local sales because some productive firms are blocked.
To examine how special deals affect the relationship between domestic sales and export sales, we recast utility as
where M denotes imports of a homogeneous product made outside of China.
The utility of consumers in the foreign country is the same. We assume the foreign country owns a limitless supply of the homogeneous good sold at a fixed price and buys differentiated varieties from China (city A or B). The rest of the model stays the same. Figure 7 summarizes the products sold in each market. Remember that productivity of A's firms falls as z increases. Figure 7 (top panel) shows that city A's most productive firms export to all markets (the foreign market and city B), but the least productive firms z ∈ [z, z c ] only sell in the local market where they are protected from competition. The bottom panel in Figure 5 shows that this is not true in city B. Remember that B is less productive as z increases. All firms in B export to the foreign market but only the most productive firms z ∈ [z c , 1] sell to the other domestic market (city A).
The least productive firms in B sell in the foreign market but are blocked in the domestic market in City A.
The top panel in Figure 8 summarizes the prediction of the model on the relationship between the exporting (to the foreign market) and the firm's domestic sales. In the model, firms with the smallest domestic sales export. These are the firms in B that find their access to other domestic markets blocked.
Moving up the size distribution, A's firms z ∈ [z, z c ] are less productive than their counterparts in B but have larger domestic sales because of market A is larger than market B. These firms do not export. We think of these firms as reflecting the case of Shanghai-GM that have large domestic sales because of their privileged position in a large domestic market, but do not export because they are not competitive without the protection. Lastly, the most productive firms in the two cities sell to all markets (foreign and all domestic markets).
The top panel in Figure 8 shows the relationship between exporting and domestic sales in the cross-section of the Chinese manufacturing data. 32 As can be seen, a remarkable feature of the Chinese data is that there is a cluster of firms with low domestic sales that also export. For comparison, the bottom panel in 8 shows the same relationship in the cross-section of the U.S. manufacturing data. 33 As can be seen, there is no such pattern in the U.S. data.
The model also makes a strong prediction about the elasticity of domestic sales with respect to exports. For the most productive firms in the two cities, the elasticity of the share of the export market with respect to the share of the domestic market should be close to one. But for the firms in B that find their access to city A blocked, the elasticity will be significantly lower than one. Intuitively, higher productivity has a larger effect on their sales in the the market 32 Figure 8 plots the data for the 2007 cross-section of the Chinese Annual Industrial Survey. The pattern is identical in all years of the data. We dropped export-processing plants from the sample. 33 The data is from the 1987 cross section of the U.S. manufacturing census. where they face no barriers compared to their sales in the domestic Chinese market where they are blocked.
The top panel in Figure 9 illustrates this prediction of the model (the thin line is the 45 o line). The elasticity of domestic sales to exports predicted by the model is lower at low levels of exports. The bottom panel in Figure 9 shows the elasticity in the Chinese data. 34 The elasticity of domestic sales to exports is essentially zero for small firms, and almost one for firms with above-mean export sales.
The idea that Chinese local governments protect local firms has a long history. Young (2000) argues that the decentralization of tax revenues in the 1980s coupled with price wedges prompted local governments to protect local industries to retain the revenues implied by the price wedge. The price wedges disappeared by the late 1980s and the 1994 tax reform that centralized tax revenues presumably removed the incentive of local governments to protect firms that generate large tax revenues.
Our argument is that the growth of the special deal regime increasingly became the main incentive for local governments to protect local firms, but this time only for the favored firms. Our evidence suggests that many Chinese firms find large segments of the Chinese domestic market closed to them. 35 Local protection is welfare reducing of course, but we argue that this effect is attenuated by the fact that local governments can only protect firms in their cities.
In addition, the case of the East Hope Group suggests suggests that many large firms have been able to strike deals with multiple local governments, which in principle can also attenuate the effect of local protection. A more important point though is that local protection is only one of the many effects of special deals, so it is imperative to take all these effects into account. And we argue that the productivity gains among the favored firms may well be significantly larger than the negative effects of local protection. 34 The data is from the 2007 cross-section of the industrial survey. 35 Barwick et al. (2017) document strong home (city level) bias of car purchases using car registration data. 
Risks
This paper forwards the hypothesis that China's growth, particularly since the early 1990s, is due to the increased availability of special deals by competing local governments. We do not provide a formal empirical "test" of this hypothesis but we believe that the totality of the evidence we present is consistent with this interpretation.
If our hypothesis is correct, then it suggests that Chinese growth is a high- Another possibility is that local officials provide special deals because local party leaders that generate more "profits for the party" are promoted by the Communist Party's Organization Department. In the absence of access to the personnel files of the Communist Party, we don't know whether this is the case.
It is possible, as some authors have done, to examine the the correlation of promotion probability and local GDP growth, and the evidence from this work is inconclusive.
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A third possibility is that local party officials work very hard to support favored private firms because they are able to obtain private rents from these firms. If this is the case, the danger is that constraints on the ability of local 36 Li and Zhou (2005) find evidence from promotion of Provincial level officials that GDP growth is positively correlated with promotion. Shih et al. (2012) 's evidence suggests that personal connections is the primary determinant of promotion. Jia et al. (2015) finds that political connections and economic performance are complements in terms of promotion in the Party hierarchy.
officials to obtain private benefits will lower growth. Since 2014, there has been an unprecedented crackdown on corruption. Figure 10 The corruption crackdown was widely supported in China and has been effective by many accounts. Yet, a concern implied by our theory is that the corruption crackdown has diminished the willingness of local officials to help local businesses. This could be because their main incentive was the monetary payoff, or it could be the fear of being accused of receiving a payoff, or the resistance of intrinsically motivated officials. All these forces will diminish the extent to which firms get special deals. Figure 11 shows that Chinese growth has slowed down significantly since the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis.
We do not know whether the anti-corruption campaign was the main driver of the growth slowdown, as there are other possibilities. In Bai et al. (2016) , for instance, we document that growing financial distortions due to the growth of local financing vehicles could also be important. At this point, the data we have at our disposal does not allow us to precisely quantify the importance of these forces.
Chinese authorities have made multiple efforts in recent years to move away from a regime of special deals. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in November 2013 issued a resolution to "let the market play the decisive role in the allocation of resources." The State Council later issued a follow up document that acknowledged "special deals" as a double-edge sword, which "promoted the investment growth and industry concentration to some extent" but "have disturbed the market order." Then, it laid out specific policies to stop local leaders from providing special deals. On the government revenue side, local governments are not allowed to provide preferential tax policies, nor to reduce administrative fee or government funds from firms or to assign land at a preferential or zero price. On the government expenditure side, local governments are prohibited from developing preferential policies for firms, including those by means of remitting taxes or granting subsidies. The Chinese "special deals" regime has been enormously successful in moving the Chinese economy to where it is today. We suggest that it has enabled the growth of the large number of Chinese firms that now dominate many world markets. We see, however, three dangers of the current system. First, a special 38 It is difficult to know whether the improvement shown in Figure 12 reflects real improvement or simply changes in methodology by the World Bank. The World Bank's Doing Business project revised its methodology in response to issues raised by the Chinese government. See "China Seeks to Water Down Key World Bank Report," Financial Times, May 6, 2013 for more details. 39 Document No. 25, State Council, 2015. deals system creates powerful entrenched interests that make reforms very difficult. 40 After all, a special deals regime, even with the Chinese characteristics that have underpinned high growth for three decades, is a second best solution.
In terms of our model, the first best is to reduce δ to zero with no special deals.
But the difficulty is that once a special deal system is in place, local officials and large businesses benefit from these deals, and their interests are threatened with any reform that reduces δ and the extent of the special deals.
Second, some of the characteristics that made the system work in the past, such as unfettered ability to provide special deals may no longer be present today. At the same time, other features of the special deal regime, such as the presence of powerful vested interest groups, are clearly still present and have a strong interest in blocking precisely the reforms that China may want to undertake in the future.
A third danger of the system is that companies based in other countries find themselves disadvantaged when they compete with Chinese companies with access to special deals that export into their market. At the same time, foreign companies in the Chinese market either have to make their own special deal or, as is the case with any Chinese firm that does not have a special deal, find that their intellectual property and contracts are not well respected. This tension between countries based on rules and one based on special deals is at the root of the conflict that China currently faces with its trading partners, with no clear resolution in sight. 40 Song and Xiong (2018) review China's economic and financial risks. Many of them have roots in the vested interests created by special deals.
